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This chapter develops empirical measures of the economic incentives for 
deferred retirement among older workers. Using a new data file on pay 
and pensions, we construct intertemporal budget sets reflecting income 
available to workers at alternative retirement ages. The analysis explores 
how continued labor force attachment is rewarded in terms of net earn- 
ings, Social Security benefits, and private pension income. 
Two motivations guide the research. First, it is important to understand 
how workers’ income opportunities change with age. Studies of retire- 
ment patterns, including our own and others’,’ have demonstrated that 
these economic rewards influence the choice of retirement age. Savings 
decisions, consumption paths, and other economic outcomes are also re- 
sponsive to the budget set at older ages. Unfortunately, data limitations 
have made it difficult for previous authors to explore the range of income 
opportunities available to older individuals. This paper presents and dis- 
cusses new empirical evidence on how older workers’ income opportuni- 
ties change as the workers age. 
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hauser and Quinn 1983; Burtless and Hausman 1982; Gordon and Blinder 1980; Gustman 
and Steinmeier 1984. 
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Exploring how companies differ in the compensation packages they of- 
fer to older workers is  important as well.  Some authors, e.g.,  Lazear 
(1982)’ have suggested that firms use their pension plans to encourage ear- 
ly retirement,  though data on this phenomenon are difficult to obtain. 
The present chapter develops a detailed description of  private pension 
structures and the ways in which they treat prolonged job attachment. 
Two main conclusions arise from the analysis. First, the data show that 
total net income rises as people defer retirement, but the size of the income 
increment varies with age. Second, the data show that some pension plans 
encourage early retirement among older workers but others penalize it. 
Thus differences in private pension structures prove to be an important 
source of variation in income opportunities among older workers. Our re- 
sults have implications for researchers interested in older workers’ income 
patterns and for policymakers who propose mandating actuarial neutral- 
ity in private pension plans. 
Section 9.1 of this chapter reviews briefly the most important theoreti- 
cal features of older workers’ income opportunities and discusses some 
general  considerations  when  building an empirical counterpart  of  the 
theoretical budget set. Section 9.2 presents our methodology and data, 
and section 9.3 presents the findings. Conclusions are collected in section 
9.4. 
9.1  Theoretical Considerations 
We consider the rewards for continued work in the context of older per- 
sons’ retirement decisions. Previous theoretical studies of retirement be- 
havior have identified the individual’s problem as selecting the optimal 
amount of work to do over the remaining lifetime, subject to income and 
time constraints.* Optimal is defined as the labor supply path that maxi- 
mizes intertemporal utility: accordingly, the goal is to select the retirement 
age that provides a worker with his most preferred combination of leisure 
time and income from among available options. The worker’s income 
constraints are determined by net earnings available from market work, 
and net Social Security and private pension benefits available during re- 
tirement. His time constraint consists of  time remaining until death; this 
time may be allocated between work and lei~ure.~ 
More formally, the worker is postulated to select the retirement age (R) 
that maximizes intertemporal utility, the arguments of which are lifetime 
consumption (C)  and lifetime leisure (RE7‘): 
2. For a review of studies of retirement behavior, see Mitchell and Fields 1982. 
3.  We  abstract here from retirement options involving part-time work or gradual with- 
drawal from the labor force; Gustman and Steinmeier 1984 and Burtless and Moffitt 1982 
consider these alternatives in some detail. For the sample of older workers described below, 
retirement may be best described as accepting the pension and leaving the firm since only a 
tiny minority ever worked after becoming pensioners. 271  Rewards for Continued Work 
U = U(C,RET); Uconcave, 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint with the following struc- 
ture: 
C = PDVY(R) + Wo -  Bo. 
In other words, planned  consumption equals the present value of  dis- 
counted income over the remainder of the individual's life (PDVY), plus 
wealth at the time of retirement decision (  WO),  minus planned bequests 
(Bo).  Survival probabilities and pure time preference are incorporated via 
a discount factor (r).  Both the lifetime utility function and the income 
constraint are viewed as stationary over time. 
The PD  VY component of the older worker's budget constraint depends 
on the retirement age chosen. This is because PDVYis composed of three 
elements, each of  which is a function of  R.  The present value of earnings 
(PDVE) is computed from the age at which the worker begins planning 
for retirement (normalized to 0) until R: 
PDVE =  E,e-"t. 
The other two components of PDVY-the  discounted values of Social Se- 
curity and pension benefits-also  depend on R since they are computed 
from R to the end of the planning horizon (T): 
0  f 
R 
and 
PD  VPP =  PPl e -  "dt. 
R. 
Annual retirement benefits are fairly complex functions of several fac- 
tors including the worker's retirement age: 
When the worker  defers retirement,  many firms raise annual pension 
benefits to acknowledge the shorter period  over which benefits will  be 
paid; when benefits are only sufficiently larger to offset increased mortal- 
ity,  the pension structure is termed actuarially neutraL4 As with private 
pension formulas, Social Security rules also provide a positive credit as R 
4.  In the empirical analysis below, we focus on defined benefit plans, i.e., those in which 
benefit amounts are functions of years of service and/or  pay rather than pension contribu- 
tions. Benefits in such plans need not be actuarially neutral. 272  Olivia S. MitcheWGary S. Fields 
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Fig. 9.1.  The intertemporal  budget set (BB') and the optimal retirement 
date (R*). 
increases. Social Security and private pension benefits depend upon two 
other variables as well. The year itself, t, enters the annual benefit compu- 
tation because benefits often vary with time. This would occur in the case 
of negotiated benefit improvements in bargained plans, or legislated So- 
cial Security formula changes. Finally, the pension factor (F)  is included 
to allow for interactions between benefits and other variables; for exam- 
ple, in some pension plans, preretirement earnings are used in the benefit 
formula. 
In addition to the income constraint, an older worker faces a total time 
constraint. By definition, years of retirement leisure (RET)  are equal to 
the difference between the individual's expected lifetime (N)  and the age 
at which retirement occurs:5 
RET= N-  R. 
Understanding the income-leisure trade-off facing older workers is fa- 
cilitated by figure 9.1.  This figure graphs the present value of income 
available to  the older individual and the expected retirement period for all 
possible retirement ages; the diagram indicates that, for this hypothetical 
worker at least, his income is lowest if he chooses to retire as early as pos- 
sible, while his income would rise substantially if  he remained with the 
firm additional years. The figure presumes that deferring retirement is re- 
warded by even more income; below we show empirically that the inter- 
temporal budget set in fact has such a shape. 
5. Remaining lifetime may, of course, vary with health. The empirical work below uses 
standard life expectancies in computing the average value of  future income streams; howev- 
er, annuities are worth less to those with shorter remaining lifespans due to poor health, and 
benefits to  such retirees should be adjusted accordingly. 213  Rewards for Continued Work 
Presenting the older worker’s decision in this way highlights the similar- 
ities between this model and the conventional labor economics approach 
to the hours-of-work decision. Figure 9.1 also indicates that the optimal 
retirement date (R*)  is determined in a familiar way: R* is the age at which 
the marginal utility of an additional increment to lifetime income is just 
offset by the loss in utility from leisure foregone. While we do not develop 
comparative dynamics for R* here, they may be derived in much the same 
manner as in the cross-sectional framework (Fields and Mitchell 1984). 
Some features of the intertemporal budget set should be underscored. 
First, the older worker’s budget set is defined over all possible retirement 
dates rather than at just one moment in time. A complete understanding 
of the rewards for continued work therefore requires that one investigate 
not only one or two points on  the budget surface, but all alternatives. Sec- 
ond, to be able to compute PDVY at each age, one must understand the 
private pension and Social Security benefit formulas facing a given work- 
er, since these institutional rules impart structure to the intertemporal 
budget  set.  Third,  the  income-leisure trade-off  embodies expectations 
about  future income  streams and  formulas,  inflation  rates,  mortality 
rates, and a host of other variables. These must also be modeled in empiri- 
cal work. 
9.2  Building the Empirical Intertemporal Budget Set 
To construct an intertemporal budget set, we require complete data on 
each  worker’s  earnings,  private  pension  benefits,  and  Social Security 
benefits. The data set used in the present empirical analysis is a subsample 
of the Benefit Amounts Survey (BAS) developed in 1978 by the U.S. De- 
partment of Labor’s Pension and Welfare Benefits Program.6 This survey 
consisted of a stratified random sample of private sector pension plans fil- 
ing reports with the Labor Department as required under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of  1974 (ERISA). The firms whose pen- 
sion plans  were  selected for analysis were  asked to provide a limited 
amount of information on the beneficiaries; data collected at the firms in- 
cluded birth year, year of retirement, and tenure with the firm for each 
sample worker. Individual records were then merged with administrative 
data from the Social Security Administration so that each worker’s file 
also contained his earnings history from 1951 on. 
The sample of workers available for analysis consists of 8,733 men born 
in 1909 or 1910. This limited age cohort was selected because, by the sur- 
vey date (1978), virtually all would have been retired, yet relatively few 
would have died and therefore been excluded from the sample. 
6.  A data appendix describing empirical computations in more detail is available from 
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For the analysis at hand, we must know the rules determining pension 
benefits.  We  constructed  such information  from union  contracts and 
summary plan descriptions on file with the U.S. Department of Labor for 
fourteen defined benefit plans.  No larger data set with information on 
both pensions and their beneficiaries is now available; the present analysis 
thus extends our own previous efforts as well as those of other analysts 
who have generally been limited to an examination of a single pension 
plan.’ On the other hand, our sample of pension plans is still small enough 
that findings reported here must be viewed as exploratory rather than re- 
presentative of pension plans as a whole. 
The plans represented here cannot be identified individually for confi- 
dentiality reasons. We may say, though, that our sample includes several 
blue collar plans negotiated with the United Auto Workers, several other 
plans in the manufacturing sector, a craft union plan, and one in the trade 
sector. 
An example of the benefit rules used in one of the United Auto Workers 
plans is given in table 9.1. Even this apparently simple years-of-service 
formula turns out to be quite complex in practice. 
The formula given in table 9.1 describes pension benefit rules in effect 
around 1970, at which time our sample workers were about sixty years of 
age. But the rules in 1970 would not necessarily have been appropriate for 
a worker who waited to  retire until, say, 1975. In this company, and in the 
other companies in our study, the pension formulas were incremented sev- 
eral times during the 1960s. In evaluating what future retirement benefits 
would have been, workers in that company might reasonably have expect- 
ed that benefits would rise in the future as much as they had in the past. 
Therefore we looked at prior union contracts, the Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics Pension Digest, and other documents to determine what had occurred 
prior to 1970. Empirical analysis of changes in pension benefits over time 
for newly retiring workers, as well as for previously retired individuals, re- 
vealed that pension plans typically raised benefits in line with inflation for 
workers not yet retired, but held nominal benefits constant for those al- 
ready retired. Therefore, the empirical model assumes that a prospective 
retiree would have expected nominal preretirement increases  just short of 
the inflation rate, but probably zero postretirement increases. 
The specific pension formula outlined in table 9.1 depends only on age 
and years of service. To compute pension amounts in plans where earn- 
ings are also used in the benefit formulas, it is necessary to know what a 
worker would have earned had he remained on his job. Earnings informa- 
tion is also needed, of course, in constructing the total lifetime income 
available from alternative retirement strategies. 
7.  See, for instance, the work of Burkhauser 1979 and Fields and Mitchell 1984 on the 
United Auto Workers, and Burtless and Hausman 1982 on  federal government workers. 275  Rewards for Continued Work 
Table 9.1  Private Pension Structure in  Company X 
Benefit  Benefit  Benefit at 65 
until 62  until 65  and Beyond 
Retire after 608  $4,800  $5,400  $2,548 
Retire after age 62b  -  $5,400  $2,944 
Retire after age 65c  -  -  $3,214 
Nore: The pension structure in company X is negotiated every three years and written 
into a contract with the United Automobile Workers union (UAW). The plan is noncon- 
tributory. The benefit formula negotiated in the early  1970s, when the sample workers 
were about sixty years of  age and were presumably deciding when to retire, varied 
depending on age and/or years of  service. The above figures applied to an individual 
who started work at company X at age thirty. 
aThis benefit is  available only  after  completing ten  years  of  service.  Calculated as 
($90  x  years  of  service less  [.04 x  the difference  between  the  retirement  age and 
621)  + $63.60. 
bThis benefit is  available only  after  completing ten  years  of  service. Calculated as 
($90  x  years of service) + $63.60. 
‘Calculated as ($90 x  years of service) + $63.60. 
Information on earnings  is available  from the BAS-Social  Security 
earnings data merged file. For the period prior to retirement, earnings in 
excess of the Social Security taxable maximum are imputed using a vari- 
ant of a routine described in Fox (1976). Earnings a worker could antici- 
pate if he did not retire are imputed from previous years’ real earnings fig- 
ures. Gross earnings are then reduced by income taxes and payroll taxes to 
obtain net earnings. 
The other element of the intertemporal budget set is Social Security 
benefits. These are computed based on the Social Security rules in effect 
in 1972. We  use 1972 benefit rules for retirement plans being devised in 
1970, because future changes had been legislated two years in advance. 
The algorithm incorporates what the worker might have anticipated had 
he retired earlier and filed for benefits when first eligible at age sixty-two, 
and what he would have received if he had postponed retiring and filing 
for benefits until later ages. As with the projection of future private pen- 
sion benefits, this requires an assumption about how benefits would have 
been expected to change over time. The algorithm incorporates the real 
growth rate in Social Security benefits experienced during the 1960s as the 
best estimate of how real benefits might have been expected to change 
during the 1970s. 
One limitation of the Social Security computation should be noted. It is 
possible to estimate only the male’s Social Security benefits, but not his 
spouse’s benefits, since marital status information is not reliably reported 
in our file. 
In moving from the annual budget set components (all of which are in 
nominal dollars) to present discounted values (which are much more in- 276  Olivia S. MitcheWGary S. Fields 
formative if  expressed in real  dollars), several additional assumptions 
must be made. Standard practice is followed by discounting each year’s 
benefits by the probability of mortality at each age, based on survival rate 
information for the cohort in question.  In addition, future benefits are 
deflated by two factors-inflation  and a real discount rate. Estimated fu- 
ture benefit streams assume continuation  of the rate of  price increases 
prevailing in the early 1970s; to discount benefits accruing in the future, 
the same nominal rate is used. In addition, a 2 percent real discount rate is 
used to reflect time preference. Confirmatory analysis with other discount 
rates produces results virtually identical to those reported below. 
The foregoing describes the construction of the budget set in the BAS 
file. In the balance of the chapter we summarize this information by cal- 
culating the overall budget set and its components for a specific “illustra- 
tive worker.”* We do this for purposes of  comparison, since it is useful to 
derive benefits using the same basic earnings and job tenure characteris- 
tics, while holding constant other factors that might vary across plans. 
Nonetheless, this illustrative individual should be relatively similar to ac- 
tual workers in the pension plan,  since benefit structures are generally 
constructed with a relevant salary range in mind. The illustrative worker 
discussed below is assigned the mean net earnings and job tenure derived 
from the underlying sample described above. The average tenure figure, 
twenty-six years, is compatible with Hall’s (1982) recent discussion of life- 
time jobs among males in the U.S. labor force. Others who have comput- 
ed pension benefits (e.g., Lazear 1982; Kotlikoff and Smith 1983) did not 
have this type of individual-level  information and were thus required to use a 
range of tenure and salary assumptions to  represent most possibilities. 
9.3  The Economic Rewards for Deferring Retirement 
As discussed earlier, two empirical questions guide our empirical explo- 
rations: (1) How do total income profiles change as workers age? and (2) 
How do pension plans reward continued work effort? Each question is in- 
vestigated in turn in this ~ection.~ 
9.3.1 
Table 9.2 displays the elements of the illustrative worker’s intertem- 
poral budget set, expressed in annual terms in the top panel and in present 
discounted value terms in the lower panel.  Expected income amounts are 
reported only until age sixty-five in this relatively aggregative table, since 
some firms prohibited employment after that age; disaggregated figures 
8.  Readers of  our earlier work should be alerted to the fact that those papers use actual 
workers in a company, not the illustrative worker used here. 
9.  The calculations in this section assume that the illustrative worker is single. Alterna- 
tive calculations assuming that he is married yield identical qualitative conclusions, except 
for one point noted below. 
The Shape of the Total Income Path (PDVY) 
10.  All present discounted value figures are reported in 1970 dollars. Table 9.2  Earnings, Social Security, and Private Pension Income at Alternative Retirement Ages, for the Illustrative Worker 
If  Retirement Occurred at Age 
60  61  62  63  64  65 
A.  Annual Amounts (nominal dollars) 
1. Net earnings (E,)  $0  8,254  8,717  9,185  9,563  9,760 
2.  Social Security (SS,)”  1,858  1,916  1,973  2,333  2,749  3,209 
3.  Net private pension (PP,)  2,190  2,350  2,322  2,513  2,724  2,634 
B.  Present Values of  Streams (real dollars) 
~  ~ 
1.  Net earnings (PDVE)  $0  7,677  15,203  22,549  29,618  36,269 
2.  Social Security (PDVSS)  27,887  28,755  29,614  31,013  32,288  33,191 
3.  Net private pension (PDVPP)  19,071  18,960  19,953  19,493  19,029  18,542 
4.  Total PDVY  $46,958  55,392  64,770  73,055  80,935  88,002 
5.  Marginal Increases  8,434  9,378  8,285  7,880  7,067 
(18%)  (17%)  (13%)  (11%)  (9%) 
Note: These computations are based on  pension algorithms devised for fourteen pension plans and illustrative worker; see text. 
PAssumes  worker retires at that age and files then or at age sixty-two, whichever is later. 278  Olivia S. MitcheWGary S. Fields 
for later ages are provided below for those plans in which continued work 
beyond age sixty-five was possible. 
Of most interest for the present discussion are the last two lines on table 
9.2 (lines B.4 and B.9,  which report total PDVY and marginal changes as 
retirement is  deferred.  The following features of  the expected PDVY 
stream are noteworthy: 
1. PDVY rises monotonically  as retirement is deferred. At each age, 
earnings plus (or minus) pension and Social Security accruals exceed the 
pension and Social Security benefits foregone. In real terms, a worker 
postponing retirement from age sixty to sixty-five would roughly double 
his real income stream. 
2. PDVY rises nonlinearly with age of retirement. The payoff to work- 
ing one additional year is highest in both dollar and percentage terms be- 
tween ages sixty and sixty-one; if  the same worker deferred retiring be- 
tween sixty-four and sixty-five, his dollar gain would be about $1,400 less, 
for a marginal percentage gain only half as large. 
Therefore, the data show that the economic rewards for postponing re- 
tirement are positive but that the gains vary across ages. Previous studies 
have not discerned these patterns because they used data containing less 
detail on the components of PDVY. 
The fact that the intertemporal budget set for older workers rewards de- 
ferred retirement implies that observed income for any particular retiree is 
a function of when he chooses to retire, rather than being exogenously 
given. If one wishes to assess income opportunities that would have been 
available to a retired worker prior to his retirement, it is necessary to de- 
velop an intertemporal budget set such as the one in table 9.2 indicating 
the magnitudes  of  contingent  income flows  at  alternative retirement 
dates. 
The observed pattern of the budget set for the BAS sample also implies 
that the value of PDVY (or its component parts) at any one particular age 
will not be very informative about the overall shape of workers' intertem- 
poral income paths.  Unfortunately, most data sets other than the BAS 
contain insufficient detail on earnings, Social Security, and private pen- 
sion benefits, making it difficult to develop a PDVY path in as much de- 
tail as here." 
On average, workers in the fourteen plans have very similar earnings 
and Social Security streams. The main source of variation arises in the pri- 
vate pension streams. These differences are elaborated below. 
9.3.2  The Shape of Private Pension Income Paths 
Pension benefits constitute a fairly significant source of income for 
older workers who participate in these plans. The top panel of table 9.2 
11. Approximations are possible using the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey; see 
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shows that annual (first-year) benefits from private pensions are sizeable, 
equaling or exceeding the single worker’s Social Security payments for all 
ages but sixty-five, where they are only slightly less.I2  Net private pension 
benefits amount to  one-quarter to one-third of after-tax earnings for indi- 
viduals in the sample.I3 
Still focusing on annual benefits, line A.3 indicates large differences in 
benefits depending on when the worker retires. On average, an age-sixty 
retiree would have received private pension income of about $2,200  in the 
year he retired.  If  he deferred retirement by one year, the addition to 
(nominal) benefits would be on the order of 7 percent. However, the mar- 
ginal pension payoff to an additional year’s work is by no means uniform 
across retirement ages; for example, benefits at age sixty-two are lower 
than for age sixty-one. This benefit decline is attributable to pension plan 
supplements provided until a retiree attains age sixty-two, the age of eligi- 
bility for Social Security. A reduction is again evident between the ages of 
sixty-four and sixty-five; the pension rules thus acknowledge that workers 
can file for full Social Security retirement income at age sixty-five and pro- 
vide a bridge for individuals retiring earlier. In general, the marginal pen- 
sion payoff to retiring one year later varies a lot across retirement ages, a 
fact not immediately evident from a cursory review of benefit rules. 
Line B.3 of table 9.2 converts the annual pension benefit figures into 
present discounted values in real dollars. Again it is evident that the re- 
ward structure built into private pensions varies for different retirement 
ages. The illustrative worker would receive more in lifetime benefits if he 
left the firm at age sixty than if he postponed retirement to age sixty-one, 
despite the fact that annual benefits are higher at age sixty-one than at sixty. 
In fact, the annual pension benefits are increased at less than actuarially 
neutral rates at several ages, as is evident from computed changes in the 
present values of lifetime benefits: 
Change in Retirement Age 
60-61  61-62  62-63  63-64  64-65 
Change in PDVPP  0%  +  5%  -  2%  -  2%  -  2% 
Clearly the structure of lifetime pension income flows very much affects 
the economic rewards for continued work. 
12. For a married worker, the sum of the worker’s plus spouse’s Social Security benefits 
exceeds private pension benefits. 
13.  Previous studies have not computed after-tax replacement rates both for private pen- 
sions and Social Security, so these figures cannot be directly compared with others in the lit- 
erature. We find that the overall replacement rate including both pensions and a single retir- 
ee’s Social Security benefit is between 50 and 60 percent on average, though in some cases 
individuals received as much as 95 percent of preretirement net earnings. Replacement rates 
would be higher if spouse benefits were included. 280  Olivia S. MitcheWGary S. Fields 
Present values in table 9.2 are averages across fourteen pension plans, 
so they conceal potentially interesting differences in company pension 
structures. Table 9.3 splits the sample into two groups: pattern and con- 
ventional plans. Pattern plans are pensions where benefits are based al- 
most exclusively on years of service with the firm (or occupation, if a craft 
union). Conventional plans, more common among nonunion firms, de- 
termine benefits based both on final salary and tenure with the firm. 
It is evident from table 9.3 that the overall means obscure some key dif- 
ferences between the two kinds of benefit structures. Pattern plans tend to 
structure their first-year benefits so that they rise more or less smoothly, 
reaching a peak at age sixty-four; annual benefits typically fall for work- 
ers deferring benefits beyond that point.  First-year benefits in conven- 
tional plans operate differently; in this case, benefits for the age-sixty-two 
retiree are lower than for the worker leaving one year earlier. It is this sub- 
group of plans that produces the dip in annual benefits found in the over- 
all mean. However, after age sixty-two, conventional plans tend to pro- 
vide ever-increasing benefit amounts for workers postponing retirement 
up to age sixty-five . 
An examination of  discounted pension values in these two types of 
plans suggests even sharper contrasts. Pattern plans (line B.2) actively dis- 
courage work beyond age sixty.14  An employee in a pattern plan who de- 
fers retirement until age sixty-five will in fact receive lifetime benefits that 
are about 18 percent lower than he would have received had he retired at 
age sixty! On the other hand, present value streams in conventional plans 
are structured so that a worker deferring retirement until age sixty-five re- 
ceives about 17 percent higher benefits than if he retired at age sixty. Thus 
between ages sixty and sixty-five, conventional pension plans appear to 
improve benefits by about the same amount that pattern plans reduce 
them. 
Clearly, the overall incentives differ between the two types of plans. To 
see whether marginal incentives are smooth or erratic, changes in pension 
present values are computed for each additional year of work: 
Change in Retirement Age 
60-61  61-62  62-63  63-64  64-65 
Pattern plans change in 
Conventional plans 
PDVPP  -2%  -2%  -5%  -5%  -5% 
changeinPDVPP  +2%  +14%  +O%  +O%  +O% 
Evidently, pattern plans actively encourage early retirement, whereas con- 
ventional plans strongly encourage work up to age sixty-two. After age 
14.  This is similar to the finding reported by Lazear 1982. Table 9.3  Net Private Pension Amounts at Alternative Retirement Ages in  Pattern and Conventional Plans 
~~~~  ~ 
If Retirement Occurred at Age 
60  61  62  63  64  65 
A.  Annual Net Pension Benefits' 
1.  Overall mean  $  2,190 
2.  Pattern plan mean  2,653 
3.  Conventional plan mean  1,728 
2,350  2,322 
2,760  2,907 





~~  ~ 
2,742  2,634 
3,214  2,626 
2,356  2,639 
B.  Present Value of Net Pension Benefitsb 
1.  Overall mean  $19,070  18,960  19,953  19,493  19,029  18,542 
2.  Pattern plan mean  24,795  24,192  23,787  22,617  21,432  20,275 
3.  Conventional plan mean  14,777  15,036  17,078  17,150  17,227  17,243 
Note: This table is based on  pension algorithms of fourteen plans as applied to the illustrative worker (see text). 
'Nominal  dollars. 























Fig. 9.2.  Present value of private pension benefits in pattern plans and 
conventional plans. 
sixty-two, conventional plans provide a flat payoff schedule for addition- 
al years of work; in pattern plans, the slope becomes strongly negative (see 
figure 9.2). 
Table 9.4 disaggregates to the level of the individual plan. This break- 
down of  pension plan benefit structures reveals even more variability in 
economic rewards for continued work. These plan-specific data permit 
the computation of  benefit streams for ages beyond sixty-five in cases 
where continued work was permitted; firms with mandatory retirement 
are indicated with a dash. 
This disaggregative investigation of  pension plan rules suggests two 
conclusions : 
1. Pension plans reward deferred retirement diperently from one com- 
pany to the next. Pattern plans as a whole, and the UAW plans in particu- 
lar, encourage early retirement by structuring benefits so that they attain a 
maximum between ages sixty and sixty-two. Conventional plans are more 
complex, but as a rule structure their benefit flows to reward continued 
work well beyond age sixty. 
2. Marginal payofls to deferred retirement are uneven; actuarial neu- 
trality across retirement ages is rare. In our sample, a worker deferring re- 
tirement  by  one year could have increased his lifetime pension income 
flow by as much as 14 percent, or reduced it by 5 percent, depending on 
the pension plan in which he worked. 
In overview, then, some private pensions reward prolonged work and oth- 
ers penalize it, both in overall and marginal terms. It is not true that pen- 
sions always discourage work beyond age sixty. 'liable 9.4  Present Values of  Net Private Pension Benefits for Alternative Retirement Ages: Plan-Level Data 
If Retirement Age Occurs at Age 
60  61  62  63  64  65  66  67  68 
A. Pattern Plans 
UAW  plans 
Plan A  $28,181  27,586  27,189  25,455  23,787  22,195  21,706  21,140  20,500 
Plan B  36,030  36,146  36,599  36,341  35,730  34,987  34,081  -  - 
Plan C  28,176  27,571  27,189  25,455  23,787  22,195  -  -  - 
Plan D  28,176  27,571  27,189  25,455  23,787  22,195  21,706  21,140  20,500 
Non-UAW plans 
Plan E  21,858  19,814  17,912  16,147  14,512  13,001  11,608  10,328  9,153 
Plan F  6,351  6,464  6,641  6,850  6,986  7,079  6,620  6,156  5,692 

























9,300  10,027 
16,841  16,977 
20,270  19,335 
15,290  15,504 
21,594  23,468 
17,668  18,291 
15,193  14,230 
20,471  19,364 
10,087  10,497  9,461 
18,173  16,869  - 
17,028  16,893  - 
18,359  17,246  16,190 
16,318  17,174  16,563 
25,295  26,981  - 
18,810  19,084  - 
















Nore: This table is based on pension algorithms as applied to illustrative worker; see text. Underlined numbers are row maxima. Dashes indicate 
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9.4  Conclusion 
The notion of an intertemporal budget set facing older workers flows 
from an economic model of choice of retirement age subject to income 
and time constraints. Measuring the budget set empirically requires that 
total discounted income be computed for each possible retirement age. In 
so doing, it is important to model Social Security and private pension 
rules defining benefits available at each age, and in addition to determine 
how workers would have expected these rules to change in the future. 
Using a unique new data set known as the Benefit Amounts Survey, we 
develop empirical answers to two questions: (1) How do workers’ total in- 
comes change as they defer retirement? and (2) Do private pension struc- 
tures reward or penalize continued work at older ages? 
The data suggest two important features of the discounted total income 
streams (PDVY) facing older workers, which have not been noted in pre- 
vious studies. First, PDVY  rises monotonically as retirement is deferred. 
This is the result of rising Social Security and earnings streams balanced 
against flat or declining private pension streams. Second, PDVY rises 
nonlinearly with age. In general the economic rewards to postponing re- 
tirement are always positive but the gains vary depending on the age in 
question. 
The data also point to two new conclusions about the incentive struc- 
tures of private pension plans. First, pension  plans reward deferred retire- 
ment dixerently across companies. Second, marginal payofls to deferred 
retirement are uneven; actuarial neutrality across retirement ages is un- 
common. Some private pensions reward prolonged work but others pe- 
nalize it. 
The patterns just noted have implications for both researchers and poli- 
cymakers. Analysts interested in modeling and estimating the determi- 
nants of retirement, savings, and other economic behavior among older 
workers must build and examine the intertemporal budget sets anticipated 
by individuals as they age. Similarly, income distribution studies should 
recognize that actual retirement income among retirees is determined to a 
significant degree by workers’ retirement behavior. These considerations 
highlight the importance of developing new data sets containing more 
complete information on workers, their earnings histories, and their com- 
pany records, including pension system rules. In particular this chapter 
has shown that evaluating older individuals’ incomes requires devising 
data sets quite different from those used by social scientists in the past. 
Conventional worker-level or even household-level  surveys collected over 
short periods of time cannot provide detail sufficient to compute accurate 
measures of Social Security benefits and private pension opportunities. 
Instead what is required is a new and more creative matching of data on 
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ploying them throughout their lifetimes. Ideally such data would also in- 
corporate other needed measures on employee health, wealth, and demo- 
graphic traits especially important for the study of income and aging. 
The observed differences in pension patterns also have an interesting 
policy implication. One proposal that has received some attention of late 
in policy circles is the idea that the federal government should mandate 
pension benefit neutrality. This proposal is motivated by the belief that 
pension structures currently encourage early retirement. It is thought that 
mandatory pension neutrality would result in higher benefits for those 
continuing to work beyond age sixty, thereby encouraging longer work- 
force commitment. However, our analysis shows that the actual result de- 
pends on the benefit structure presently available to the covered employ- 
ee. In pattern plans, the effect of mandatory neutrality would probably be 
to cut early benefits rather than to increase later ones. Though this would 
affect retirement  ages in the anticipated  direction, retirement  benefits 
would be lower than at present, not higher. 
In conventional plans, on the other hand, mandatory neutrality could 
conceivably remove the desired incentives currently in place to defer re- 
tirement; such a result would not be consistent with federal efforts to en- 
courage later retirement. Altering pension reward structures currently in 
place could produce other undesirable results as well. If the current pen- 
sion benefits patterns are structured in accordance with firms’ perceptions 
of the relative efficiency of  older workers compared to younger ones, im- 
posing regulatory restrictions would be expected to increase firms’ costs, 
some part of which would probably be passed on to workers in the form 
of  lower wages or lower pension benefits. Both the welfare and the effi- 
ciency costs of  mandating pension neutrality should be analyzed much 
more carefully before concluding that such a policy is desirable. 
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COmment  Joseph F.  Quinn 
As it was with Gaul, so shall it be with my remarks. I will divide them into 
three parts: a brief introduction to put this chapter by Olivia Mitchell and 
Gary Fields (or vice versa) into perspective within the retirement litera- 
Joseph F. Quinn is professor of economics  at Boston College. 281  Rewards for Continued Work 
ture, a summary of what they have attempted and discovered, and some 
comments and suggestions for further improvement. 
The retirement decision is a research area of considerable recent prog- 
ress. The traditional view of the retirement decision was that it was usually 
imposed on an individual by an outside event such as mandatory retire- 
ment,  a layoff, or a health  problem.  Once retired,  the individual then 
turned  to whatever retirement  income sources were available and was 
grateful for them. The idea that these income sources might have induced 
the retirement behavior was given little currency. The  support for this view 
came from surveys in which recent retirees were asked why they retired. 
The most common answer was always health, and the existence of Social 
Security or pension benefits was only rarely mentioned.  Today, on the 
other hand, nearly everyone agrees that there are financial incentives in 
our retirement income plans, that they play an important role in individ- 
ual retirement decisions, and that these incentives can be used as pqlicy in- 
struments to alter aggregate behavior. 
Until recently, analysts tended to describe the magnitude of retirement 
income rights by the size of the annual benefit, or by its close relative, the 
replacement rate.  Though useful summary statistics, these annual flow 
concepts ignore key  aspects of  the retirement  incentives-how  annual 
benefits change with continued work or with inflation after retirement. It 
is now generally agreed that a superior summary statistic is a pension’s as- 
set or stock equivalent-the  present discounted value (PDV) of future 
benefits. This new view,  emphasizing retirement  wealth, has become a 
mainstay of modern retirement research. 
These new views on  the quantification of complex retirement income ar- 
rangements and on their behavioral impact are the result of a decade of in- 
tense research activity by economists, including Mitchell and Fields (and 
vice versa). Some have tried to quantify the magnitude of  the incentives; 
others to measure their impact on individual behavior. To do so, analysts 
have taken one of  two approaches-extensive  or intensive. The extensive 
approach, which has characterized Richard Burkhauser’s and my work, 
utilizes large microdata sets, such as the Retirement History Study or the 
National Longitudinal Surveys. The advantages are a large representative 
sample and extensive demographic, social, and economic data on the re- 
spondents. The disadvantage is very spotty information on the details of 
the individuals’ pension plans. The latter is particularly unfortunate for at 
least two  reasons.  A  key  incentive derives  from how  pension  wealth 
changes with continued work-details  unavailable on the large microdata 
sets. And, as we will see below, much of the interpersonal variation in in- 
centives comes from pension plans. Most of this is lost to the extensive re- 
searchers. 
Mitchell and Fields, on  the other hand, have taken the intensive route- 
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and their recipients. The advantages are obvious-they  can (and do) cal- 
culate the actual financial consequences of individuals retiring at various 
ages. The big disadvantage is that they can do so for only a small sample. 
It is impossible to extrapolate to the economy and to know how general, 
and important, their findings are. 
This chapter is descriptive. It describes what the work incentives looked 
like around 1970 for a representative individual in fourteen actual pension 
plans. It does not ask whether their incentives influenced retirement be- 
havior. 
The chapter begins with a theoretical section describing how an individ- 
ual chooses a retirement age to maximize intertemporal utility. The deci- 
sion affects three components of wealth-the  present discounted values 
of  future earnings, pension benefits,  and Social Security receipts. The 
last two are complex, because delayed retirement after eligibility implies 
foregone pension benefits today, but higher benefits in the future. Wheth- 
er the individual gains or loses retirement income wealth depends on the 
person’s work history and on the details of the pension plan-precisely  the 
details that Mitchell and Fields (and few others) have mastered. Frankly, I 
think the theoretical section adds little to our understanding. It ignores is- 
sues of uncertainty concerning the length of life or the size or likelihood of 
future benefits. It ignores hours of  work, the possibility of partial retire- 
ment, or retirement and later reemployment. But it does emphasize the 
importance of analyzing the financial implications of retirement at all pos- 
sible ages (not just the current one or sixty-two or sixty-five), and it leads 
nicely into the empirical section of the chapter where the real contribution 
lies. 
The data set includes all the relevant details on fourteen pension plans 
in the 1978 Benefit Amounts Survey (BAS) of  the Department of Labor. 
Also included are sparse descriptions of the plans’ 1978 beneficiaries (year 
of birth, year of retirement, and tenure with the firm) and their Social Se- 
curity earnings records since 195 1. These individual data are not used in 
the paper except to define an “illustrative worker.” (And it is not com- 
pletely clear whether this worker is the same for all firms, or if one is in- 
vented for each. I suspect the former.) The authors then back up to 1970, 
when this worker was sixty years old and presumably contemplating re- 
tirement. With these data, they ask two questions for this same worker in 
each of the fourteen pension plans: (1) How does the total income profile 
(the PDV of future after-tax earnings plus pensions plus Social Security) 
fare with retirement at each age from sixty to sixty-five? and (2) How do 
the pension plans alone reward continued work? Does the size of pension 
wealth rise or fall with later and later retirement? 
The first question is addressed only in table 9.2, where the results from 
all fourteen defined benefit plans are aggregated and averaged. The au- 
thors find that the PDV of total future income always rises with delayed 
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ways outweigh a year’s benefits lost. This is no surprise. Work pays more 
than retirement. But what is interesting is the magnitude of the increment 
in each subsequent year of  work. Though positive, it declines for each 
year after sixty-two, the age of  earliest Social Security eligibility. This 
means that even if paychecks grow, true compensation is falling because 
of losses in private pension wealth. This representative worker keeps get- 
ting his pay cut if he works beyond sixty-two-surreptitiously  cut, but cut 
nonetheless. And the magnitude of the change is large. His net compensa- 
tion drops from $9,378 at age sixty-one to sixty-two to only $7,067 at sixty- 
four to sixty-five, a decrement of 25 percent. 
What is impressive about table 9.2 is that it includes the three major 
streams of  income that depend on the retirement age chosen, expresses 
them in PDV form, and adds them together. The profiles of the sum are 
potentially  interesting  and  important  in  understanding  behavior.  The 
problem is that there is too much averaging in the table-across  individ- 
uals (since only an illustrative person is considered) and then across four- 
teen diverse plans. This averaging has eliminated much of the variation 
that the chapter is about. 
I do not know how to interpret these numbers because an “average 
plan” makes no sense to me. My first suggestion is that table 9.2 would be 
more interesting if the two key rows (the PDVof total future income by re- 
tirement age (B.4) and the incremental changes in this sum (B.5) were re- 
peated for each of the plans. For reasons described below, this would be 
the best part of the paper. 
The authors do proceed to disaggregate, but only for the pension com- 
ponent. Future earnings and Social Security benefits are ignored after ta- 
ble 9.2. They first disaggregate the fourteen plans into two categories, de- 
pending on whether earnings (or just years of service) enter the pension 
benefit formula. They then analyze the fourteen plans separately. 
The key finding, which is very interesting, is diversity. Does pension 
wealth rise or fall with continued work?  It depends.  Pattern plans (in 
which benefits depend solely on years of service) tend to have falling pro- 
files. Of the six studied, four peaked at age sixty, and one peaked at sixty- 
two. On the other hand, pension wealth in conventional plans (which also 
consider terminal earnings in the benefit calculation) tend to rise with de- 
layed retirement, at least until age sixty-five. Of the eight studied, four 
peaked at sixty-five, and one at sixty-four. Pattern plans encourage early 
retirement by penalizing continued work; conventional plans do just the 
opposite. But all plans, it should be noted, drop in value after age sixty- 
five. This combines with the actuarially unfair Social Security adjustment 
after sixty-five to create a substantial work disincentive for workers over 
that age. 
This information, found in table 9.4, is fascinating. It is precisely the 
detail that other researchers have had to do  without or invent. It illustrates 
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there was considerable diversity (relative to Social Security, for example) 
with respect to pension coverage and benefit levels. Now we see that the 
implicit work incentives vary greatly as well. This is precisely what is needed 
to understand retirement behavior. 
Unfortunately, it is only part of the story, and here is where the chapter 
could be dramatically improved. Pension plans are frequently integrated 
with Social Security as the authors note. The benefits often decrease when 
one becomes eligible for Social Security. This is observed in table 9.2, 
where the average pension benefit drops at age sixty-two and again at sixty- 
five. But this is being offset, according to their same table 9.2, by higher 
Social Security benefits, and earnings as well. What sense does it make to 
isolate one component (pensions), especially when it is specifically inte- 
grated with another (Social Security)? Whether pensions encourage or 
discourage early retirement is much less important than whether pensions 
and Social Security in tandem do. This joint impact is discussed in table 
9.2, but only as the average of  fourteen dissimilar plans. What this chap- 
ter lacks is the methodology of table 9.2  and the disaggregation of  table 
9.4. Can this not be done? It would be a useful contribution to the field. 
My second major suggestion concerns expectations. Mitchell and Fields 
turn back the clock, returning their representative individuals to the days 
of yesteryear-to  1970, to be exact. They then “forecast” real earnings 
and pension and Social Security benefits for the next five or more years. 
How should this be done? Should they use the experiences that actually 
occurred, which, of course, we now know? Or should they use what a rea- 
sonable person might have expected if planning to retire in 1970? What if 
the retirement decision was not made until 1975? Should they use 1970 ex- 
pectations or those appropriate for 1975? In either case, upon what would 
the expectations be based? 
There is a great deal of mystery about what was done, because the de- 
tails are never spelled out. For example, in forecasting real pension bene- 
fits, the authors looked into the 1960s and found 
that pension plans typically raised benefits in line with inflation for 
workers not yet retired, but held nominal benefits constant for those al- 
ready retired. Therefore, the empirical model assumes that a prospec- 
tive retiree would have expected nominal preretirement increases just 
short of the inflation rate, but probably zero postretirement increases. 
(P. 274, emphasis mine) 
Why “just short of”? How much “short of”? Why “probably”? What 
was actually done? The reader should know. 
Concerning  prospective earnings, the hints are sparser. “Earnings a 
worker could anticipate if  he did not retire are imputed from previous 
years’ real earnings figures” (p. 275). How? What real growth rate was as- 
sumed? And what methods were used to compute income and payroll 
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For Social Security, Mitchell and Fields use the 1972 rules, and “the real 
growth rate in Social Security benefits experienced during the 1960s as the 
best estimate of how real benefits might have been expected to change dur- 
ing the 1970s” (p. 275). What is this growth rate? How was it obtained? 
Would this not have dramatically underestimated what actually happened 
beginning in 1969? Does it make sense to apply the 1972 rules to someone 
who works through 1975 and then decides to retire? 
Finally, future benefits are deflated by inflation and a real discount rate 
(2 percent). The authors assume continuation of  the inflation rates ob- 
served in the early 1970s, but we are not told what the assumed inflation 
rate is or why expectations are based on early 1970s inflation, but on 1960s 
experiences with Social Security and pension benefits. 
I harp on these problems because the numbers generated by these as- 
sumptions are the heart and soul of this chapter-what  it is all about. The 
chapter should include a statement of the general expectations philosophy 
being used, details on how this philosophy is applied in each case, and 
some indication of how sensitive the results are to the expectations as- 
sumptions made. Only then can the reader adequately evaluate the inter- 
esting conclusions that are drawn. 
Let me summarize and conclude. This chapter differs from most of the 
recent literature on retirement incentives in three important ways. Mitch- 
ell and Fields use a small number of actual pension plans for which they 
know the benefit calculation rules. They calculate the present discounted 
value of future earnings, pension, and Social Security benefits, and they 
do so for every possible retirement age within the range of  interest. It is 
nice work, and I appreciate the complexity of what they have done. The 
resulting chapter is good and interesting. But, it could be better and more 
interesting. Here is how. 
I would reduce the theory  section and eliminate figure 9.1. I would 
eliminate table  9.2, which  contains too much averaging-across  eight 
thousand  individuals and fourteen pension plans-to  be  interesting.  I 
would then combine the methodology of table 9.2 (combining all three fu- 
ture income flows, not just pensions) and the degree of disaggregation of 
table 9.4 (individual plans). Finally, I would add a detailed appendix ex- 
plaining exactly what assumptions and figures the authors used to forecast 
the subsequent decade from their 1970 vantage point, and how much dif- 
ference they made. 
I end with two suggestions for future research. These are topics well be- 
yond the scope of this chapter. First, how have these incentive structures 
changed since the 1977 elimination of mandatory retirement at sixty-five? 
Have firms, deprived of the stick, augmented the carrot to induce  workers 
to do what they could previously force them to. It would be fascinating to 
know if they have. And second, what explains the wide diversity in incen- 
tive structures-the  fact that some firms encourage early retirement while 
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pattern versus conventional-which  is an uninteresting dimension from 
an economics point of view. Are there other aspects of the firm or indus- 
try-growth  in product demand, importance of new technology, worker- 
training requirements-that  seem to explain why employees are induced 
to leave in one case and to stay in another. This information would shed 
valuable insight on whether these plans are  designed  to induce specific be- 
havior, which I suspect they are, or whether they have evolved by histori- 
cal accident. 